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Abstract
Global Positioning System (GPS) is used ubiquitously in
a wide variety of applications ranging from navigation
and tracking to modern smart grids and communication
networks. However, it has been demonstrated that mod-
ern GPS receivers are vulnerable to signal spoofing at-
tacks. For example, today it is possible to change the
course of a ship or force a drone to land in an hostile
area by simply spoofing GPS signals. Several counter-
measures have been proposed in the past to detect GPS
spoofing attacks. These countermeasures offer protec-
tion only against naive attackers. They are incapable of
detecting strong attackers such as those capable of seam-
lessly taking over a GPS receiver, which is currently re-
ceiving legitimate satellite signals, and spoofing them to
an arbitrary location. Also, there is no hardware plat-
form that can be used to compare and evaluate the effec-
tiveness of existing countermeasures in real-world sce-
narios. In this work, we present SPREE, which is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first GPS receiver capable of
detecting all spoofing attacks described in literature. Our
novel spoofing detection technique called auxiliary peak
tracking enables detection of even a strong attacker capa-
ble of executing the seamless takeover attack. We imple-
ment and evaluate our receiver against three different sets
of GPS signal traces and show that SPREE constrains
even a strong attacker (capable of seamless takeover at-
tack) from spoofing the receiver to a location not more
than 1 km away from its true location. This is a signif-
icant improvement over modern GPS receivers that can
be spoofed to any arbitrary location. Finally, we release
our implementation and datasets to the community for
further research and development.
1 Introduction
Today, a number of security- and safety-critical applica-
tions rely on Global Positioning Systems (GPS) [24] for
positioning and navigation. A wide-range of applications
such as civilian and military navigation, people and asset
tracking, emergency rescue and support, mining and ex-
ploration, atmospheric studies, smart grids, modern com-
munication systems use GPS for localization and timing.
GPS is a satellite based navigation system that consists of
more than 24 satellites orbiting at more than 20,000 km
above the earth. Each satellite continuously broadcasts
data called “navigation messages” containing its precise
time of transmission and the satellites location. The GPS
receiver on the ground receives each of the navigation
messages and estimates their time of arrival. Based on
the time of transmission that is contained in the naviga-
tion message itself and its time of arrival, the receiver
computes its distance to each of the visible satellites.
Once the receiver acquires the navigation messages from
at-least four satellites, the GPS receiver estimates its own
location and precise time using the standard technique of
multilateration.
However, the civilian GPS navigation messages that
are transmitted by the satellites lack any form of signal
authentication. This is one of the prime reasons GPS is
vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks. In a GPS spoof-
ing attack, an attacker transmits specially crafted signals
identical to those of the satellites but at a higher power
that is sufficient enough to overshadow the legitimate
satellite signals. The GPS receiver then computes a false
location and time based on the stronger spoofing signal
transmitted by the attacker. As a result, today, it is pos-
sible to spoof a GPS receiver to any arbitrary location.
For example, researchers have demonstrated the insecu-
rity of GPS-based navigation by diverting the course of
a yacht using spoofed GPS signals [8]. A similar hijack
was also successfully executed on a drone using a GPS
spoofer that costs less than $1000. More recently, re-
searchers demonstrated a GPS signal generator that can
be built for less than $300 [3]. The increasing availabil-
ity of low-cost radio hardware platforms [1] make it fea-
sible to execute such attacks with less than few hundred
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dollars worth of hardware equipment. More advanced
attacks were demonstrated in [26, 31] in which the at-
tackers takeover a target receiver that is already locked
(continuously receiving navigation messages) on to au-
thentic satellite signals without the receiver noticing any
disruption or loss of navigation data. It was shown that
a variety of commercial GPS receivers were vulnerable
and in some cases even caused permanent damage to the
receivers. It is thus evident that these threats are real and
it is important to secure GPS from such signal spoofing
attacks.
Although spoofing attacks can be, to a certain extent,
mitigated by adding cryptographic authentication to the
navigation messages (e.g., military GPS systems where
the spreading codes are secret), their use requires distri-
bution and management of shared secrets, which makes
them impractical for majority of applications. Even with
cryptographic authentication, the system is not protected
against relay attacks where an attacker simply records
and replays the radio signals to the receiver [27]. Sev-
eral countermeasures that did not require cryptographic
authentication were proposed in recent years either to de-
tect or to mitigate signal spoofing attacks. They rely on
detecting anomalies in certain physical characteristics of
the signal such as received satellite signal strength, am-
bient noise floor levels, automatic gain control [9] values
and other data that are readily available as receiver ob-
servables on modern GPS receivers. Some other coun-
termeasures leveraged the signal’s spatial characteris-
tics [25, 30] such as the received GPS signal’s direction
or angle of arrival. All the above mentioned counter-
measures are ineffective against attackers capable of ma-
nipulating navigation message contents in real time or a
seamless takeover attack [26, 31]. Additionally, majority
of these solutions are not reliable in an environment with
strong multipath (signal copies that reach the receiver
with a time delay due to reflections in the environment
etc.) or in the case of a mobile receiver. Moreover, today
there is no receiver platform that can be used to compare
and evaluate the effectiveness of these countermeasures
in real-world scenarios.
In this work, we present a novel GPS receiver which
we refer to as SPREE and make the following contri-
butions: SPREE is to the best of our knowledge, the
first commercially off the shelf, single-antenna, receiver
capable of detecting or significantly limiting all known
GPS spoofing attacks described in literature. SPREE
does not rely on GPS signal authentication and can there-
fore be used to detect both civilian and military GPS
spoofing attacks. Additionally, it is designed to be stan-
dalone and does not depend on other hardware such as
antennas, additional sensors or alternative sources of lo-
cation information (like maps or inertial navigation sys-
tems). In SPREE, we introduce a novel spoofing detec-
tion technique called auxiliary peak tracking that lim-
its even a strong attacker (e.g., seamless takeover) from
being able to move (spoof) a receiver to any arbitrary
location or time. We leverage the presence of authen-
tic signals in addition to the attacker’s signals to de-
tect spoofing attacks. We implement SPREE by modi-
fying an open source software-defined GPS receiver [15]
and evaluate it against different signal data sets includ-
ing the de-facto standard of publicly available reposi-
tory of GPS signal spoofing traces (Texas Spoofing Bat-
tery (TEXBAT) [17]). Furthermore, we evaluate SPREE
against COTS GPS simulators and our own traces ob-
tained through an extensive wardriving effort of over 200
km. Our analysis shows that SPREE can reliably detect
any manipulations to the navigation message contents.
In addition, SPREE severely limits even strong attackers
capable of taking over a receiver that is currently locked
(receiving and decoding) on to legitimate satellite signals
without being noticed. Our evaluations showed that such
a strong attacker could offset the SPREE’s location to a
maximum of 1 km away from its true location. Finally,
we release our implementation and a set of recorded GPS
signal traces used for evaluating SPREE to the commu-
nity for further research and development.
2 GPS Overview
2.1 GPS Satellite System
GPS comprises more than 24 satellites orbiting the earth
at more than 20,000 km above the ground. Each satellite
is equipped with high-precision atomic clocks and hence
the timing information available across all the satellites
are in near-perfect synchronization. Each satellite trans-
mits messages referred to as the navigation messages that
are spread using pseudorandom codes that are unique to
a specific satellite.
The navigation data transmitted by each of the satel-
lites consists of a 1500 bit long data frame which is di-
vided into 5 subframes [11]. Subframes 1, 2 and 3 carry
the same data across each frame. The data contained in
subframes 4 and 5 is split into 25 pages and is transmitted
over 25 navigation data frames. The navigation data is
transmitted at 50bps with the duration of each subframe
being 6 seconds. Each frame lasts 30 seconds and the
entire navigation message, containing 25 such frames,
takes 12.5 minutes to be received completely by a re-
ceiver. The first subframe mainly contains satellite clock
information. The second and third subframes contain the
ephemeris i.e., information related to the satellite’s or-
bit and is used in computing the satellite position. Sub-
frames 4 and 5 contain the almanac data i.e., the satellite
orbital and clock information with reduced precision for
all satellites.
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Figure 1: GPS receiver architecture. The RF front-end
(not shown in Fig) preprocesses the received satellite sig-
nals. The acquisition module searches for any visible
satellite signals and if detected forwards it to the track-
ing module. The tracking module decodes the navigation
data which is used in estimating the position, velocity
and time.
2.2 GPS Receiver
A typical GPS receiver consists of four main building
blocks: (i) RF front-end, (ii) Acquisition module, (iii)
Tracking module and (iv) Position, Velocity, Time (PVT)
estimator module. The RF front-end block pre-processes
the received satellite signals and forwards it to the acqui-
sition module. The acquisition module is responsible for
searching for any satellite signals and forwarding the sig-
nal to the tracking module when a visible satellite signal
is detected. The tracking module decodes and extracts
the navigation data from the acquired signal and sends it
to the PVT estimator module for computing the receivers
location and time.
The acquisition module searches for satellite signals
by correlating its own replica of the pseudorandom code
corresponding to each of the satellites. In addition, the
carrier frequency of the satellite signals can differ from
its true value due to the relative motion of the satellite
and the receiver itself (doppler effect). Thus, in order to
detect any visible satellite signal, the receiver performs
a two-dimensional search. First, it has to search through
all possible delays (phase) of the pseudorandom code.
Second, the receiver must account for frequency errors
that occur due to the doppler effect and other environ-
mental interferences. Figure 2 shows the output of a sig-
nal acquisition phase. If the code and doppler searches
result in a peak above a certain threshold the GPS re-
ceiver then switches to tracking and demodulating the
navigation message data. The decoded data is used to
estimate the receiver’s range or distance from each of
the visible satellites. In-order to determine the range, the
receiver needs the satellite signal’s transmission and re-
ception time. The transmission time of each subframe is
found in the navigation message and the reception time
is estimated by the receiver. It is important to note that
the satellite clocks are in tight synchronization with each
other while the receiver’s clock (not using atomic crys-
tals) contain errors and biases. Due to the receiver’s
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Figure 2: GPS Signal Acquisition. The result of the cor-
relation for a real satellite signal acquisition.
clock bias, the estimated ranges are referred to as pseudo-
ranges. The receiver requires at-least four pseudoranges
to estimate its position after eliminating the effect of re-
ceiver clock bias.
3 GPS Spoofing Attacks
A GPS signal spoofing attack is a physical-layer attack
in which an attacker transmits specially crafted radio
signals that are identical to authentic satellite signals.
Civilian GPS is easily vulnerable to signal spoofing at-
tacks. This is due to the lack of any signal authentication
and the publicly known spreading codes for each satel-
lite, modulation schemes and data structure. In a signal
spoofing attack, the objective of an attacker may be to
force a target receiver to (i) compute a false geographic
location, (ii) compute a false time or (iii) disrupt the re-
ceiver by transmitting unexpected data. Due to the low
power of the legitimate satellite signal at the receiver,
the attacker’s spoofing signals can trivially overshadow
the authentic signals. During a spoofing attack, the GPS
receiver locks (acquires and tracks) on to the stronger
signal i.e., the attacker’s signals, ignoring the legitimate
satellite signals. This results in the receiver computing
a false position, velocity and time based on the spoofing
signals.
An attacker can influence the receiver’s position and
time estimate in two ways: (i) manipulating the contents
of the navigation messages (e.g., location of satellites,
navigation message transmission time) and/or (ii) mod-
ify the arrival time of the navigation messages. The at-
tacker can manipulate the arriving time by temporally
shifting the navigation message signals while transmit-
ting the spoofing signals. We classify the different types
of spoofing attacks based on how synchronous (in time)
and consistent (with respect to the contents of the navi-
gation messages) the spoofing signals are in comparison
to the legitimate GPS signals currently being received at
the receiver’s true location.
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Figure 3: Spoofing attack. The attacker uses a commer-
cial GPS simulator to transmit signals identical to legit-
imate satellite signals but with a higher power to over-
shadow the legitimate signals. The receiver computes a
false location and time based on the spoofing signals.
Non-Coherent and Modified Message Contents: In this
type of a attack, the attacker’s signals are both unsyn-
chronized and contain different navigation message data
in comparison to the authentic signals. Attackers who
use GPS signal generators [2, 4] to execute the spoofing
attack typically fall under this category. An attacker
with little know-how can execute a spoofing attack using
these simulators due to their low complexity, portability
and ease of use. Some advanced GPS signal generators
are even capable of recording and replaying signals,
however not in real-time. In other words, the attacker
uses the simulator to record at one particular time in
a given location and later replays it. Since they are
replayed at a later time, the attacker’s signals are not
coherent and contain different navigation message data
than the legitimate signals currently being received.
Non-Coherent but Unmodified Message Contents: In
this type of attack, the navigation message contents
of the transmitted spoofing signals are identical to
the legitimate GPS signals currently being received.
However, the attacker temporally shifts the spoofing
signal thereby manipulating the spoofing signal’s time
of arrival at the target receiver. For example, attackers
capable of real-time record and replay of GPS signals
fall under this category as they will have the same
navigation contents as that of the legitimate GPS signals,
however shifted in time. The location or time offset
caused by such an attack on the target receiver depends
on the time delay introduced both by the attacker and
due to the propagation time of the relayed signal. The
attacker can precompute these delays and successfully
spoof a receiver to a desired location.
Coherent but Modified Message Contents: The attacker
generates spoofing signals that are synchronized to
the authentic GPS signals. However, the contents of
the navigation messages are not the same as that of
the currently seen authentic signals. For example,
attacks such as those proposed in [26] can be classified
under this category. Nighswander et al. [26] present
a Phase-Coherent Signal Synthesizer (PCSS) that is
capable of generating a spoofing signal with the same
code phase as the legitimate GPS signal that the target
receiver is currently locked on to. Additionally, the
attacker modifies the contents of the navigation message
in real-time (and with minimal delay) and replays it
to the target receiver. A variety of commercial GPS
receivers were shown to be vulnerable to this attack and
in some cases, it even caused permanent damage to the
receivers.
Coherent and Unmodified Message Contents: Here, the
attacker does not modify the contents of the navigation
message and is completely synchronized to the authentic
GPS signals. Even though the receiver locks on to the
attacker’s spoofing signals (due to the higher power),
there is no change in the location or time computed
by the target receiver. Therefore, this is not an attack
in itself but is an important first step in executing the
seamless takeover attack.
3.1 Seamless Takeover Attack
The seamless takeover attack is considered one of the
strongest attacks in literature. In a majority of applica-
tions, the target receiver is already locked on to the legit-
imate GPS satellite signals. The goal of an attacker is to
force the receiver to stop tracking the authentic GPS sig-
nals and lock on to the spoofing signals without causing
any signal disruption or data loss. This is because the tar-
get receiver can potentially detect the attack based on the
abrupt loss of GPS signal. Consider the example of a ship
on its way from the USA to the UK as shown in Figure 4.
The GPS receiver on the ship is currently locked on to
the legitimate satellite signals. In a seamless takeover
attack, first, the attacker transmits spoofing signals that
are synchronized with the legitimate satellite signals and
are at a power level lower than the received satellite sig-
nals. The receiver is still locked on to legitimate satellite
signals due to the higher power and hence there is no
change in the ship’s route. The attacker then gradually
increases the power of the spoofing signals until the tar-
get receiver stops tracking the authentic signal and locks
on to the attacker’s spoofing signals. Note that during
this takeover, the receiver does not see any loss of lock,
in other words, the takeover was seamless. Even though
the target receiver is now locked on to the attacker, there
is still no change in the route as the spoofing signals are
both coherent with the legitimate satellite signals as well
as there is no modification to the contents of the naviga-
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Figure 4: Seamless takeover attack. The receiver is locked on to the legitimate satellite signals. The spoofing signal is
synchronized with the legitimate signal and has the same navigation contents. Next, the attacker slowly increases the
power of the spoofing signal. The receiver stops tracking the legitimate signals and locks on to the attacker’s signal.
Finally, the attacker temporally shifts the spoofing signal causing the receiver to compute a false location and thereby
changing the ship’s route.
tion message itself. Now, the attacker begins to manip-
ulate the spoofing signal such that the receiver computes
a false location and begins to alter its course. The at-
tacker can either slowly introduce a temporal shift from
the legitimate signals or directly manipulate the naviga-
tion message contents to slowly deviate the course of the
ship to a hostile destination. Tippenhauer et al. [31] de-
scribe the requirements for an attacker to execute a seam-
less takeover and move the target receiver towards the
intended location.
3.2 Performance of Existing Countermea-
sures
In this section, we discuss existing countermeasures
and describe their effectiveness against various types of
spoofing attacks. A number of countermeasures were
based on detecting anamolies in the physical-layer char-
acteristics of the received signal. In addition to the esti-
mated position, velocity and time, modern GPS receivers
output information pertaining to certain physical-layer
characteristics directly as receiver observables. Mod-
ern GPS receivers can be configured to output, for ex-
ample, automatic gain control (AGC) values, received
signal strength (RSS) from individual satellites, carrier
phase values, estimated noise floor levels etc. A number
of previous works [9, 10, 33] proposed using some of the
above mentioned receiver observables to realize spoofing
awareness in a GPS receiver. For example, in [33] the au-
thors suggest monitoring the absolute and relative signal
strength of the received satellite signals for anomalies,
number of visible satellites (should not be high), simulta-
neous acquisition of satellite signals, etc. Other counter-
measures such as detecting sudden changes to the AGC
values were also proposed for detecting GPS spoofing
attacks. Automatic Gain Controller (AGC) is a hard-
ware module that varies the gain of the internal amplifier
depending on the strength of the received signal. Such
countermeasure are at best capable of detecting attackers
who transmit their spoofing signal at very high power.
They are ineffective against attackers who have better
control over their spoofing signal.
Several spoofing detection strategies based on analyz-
ing the distortions present in the output of the receiver’s
correlation function were proposed in [28, 36]. In an
ideal noise-free environment, the correlation output has
minimal distortions. The authors argue that during a
spoofing attack, the attacker’s signal would distort the
output of the correlators, which can be used to detect the
attack itself. However, the correlation output is also dis-
torted due to multipath signals that arrive a few nanosec-
onds later than the direct signal. Wesson et al. [36]
showed that it is indeed difficult to distinguish between
the distortions caused due to a spoofing attack and a le-
gitimate multipath signal. Spoofing detection techniques
based on the differences in the inherent spatial character-
istics of the received signal such as direction or angle of
arrival [13, 25, 29] also face the same challenge of reli-
ably distinguishing between legitimate multipath signals
and a spoofing attack. Additionally, they also require ad-
ditional hardware modifications to the GPS receiver. To
summarize, although several countermeasures have been
proposed in literature to detect spoofing attacks, there
is no countermeasure today that is effective in detect-
ing strong attackers such as a seamless takeover attack.
Moreoever, there is no platform that can be used to com-
pare and evaluate the effectiveness of existing counter-
measures in real-world scenarios. Today, it is still pos-
sible to spoof a victim receiver to any arbitrary location
without being detected.
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4 SPREE – A Spoofing Resilient GPS Re-
ceiver
The design of SPREE is largely motivated by the lack of
a GPS receiver capable of detecting or constraining all
the spoofing attacks known in literature. In this section,
we present the design of SPREE, the first GPS receiver
capable of detecting or constraining all known spoofing
attacks. Our receiver design consists of two key compo-
nents: (i) Auxiliary Peak Tracker (APT) and (ii) Navi-
gation Message Inspector (NAVI) module. First, we de-
scribe the auxiliary peak tracking module, a novel coun-
termeasure which plays a vital role in constraining even
a strong attacker capable of a seamless takeover. The key
feature of APT is that it acquires and tracks not only the
strongest received satellite signal but also the weaker sig-
nals that may be present in the environment. Second, we
introduce a navigation message inspector (NAVI) which
inspects the decoded contents of the navigation message
from every satellite and reports any discrepancies. We
show that NAVI is capable of detecting attackers who
modify the contents of the navigation message. The
Auxiliary Peak Tracker protects SPREE from attackers
who are not synchronized (non-coherent) to the legiti-
mate GPS signals currently being received and the Navi-
gation Message Inspector prevents attackers from modi-
fying the contents of the navigation message. The combi-
nation of auxiliary peak tracking and the navigation mes-
sage inspector enables SPREE to reliably detect all types
of spoofing attacks.
4.1 Auxiliary Peak Tracking (APT)
In this section, we describe the details of our proposed
Auxiliary Peak Tracking technique, which is one of
SPREE’s key features that makes it resilient to spoof-
ing attacks. Typically, GPS receivers have multiple ac-
quisition and tracking modules to simultaneously search
and track different satellites. Each set of acquisition and
tracking module is called a channel and each satellite sig-
nal is acquired and tracked by only one channel. For
example, a 24-channel GPS receiver can simultaneously
search for 24 satellites thereby shortening the time to ac-
quire a position fix when compared to a 4-channel re-
ceiver. In other words, the receiver searches for a satel-
lite by allocating each channel to one specific satellite.
The receiver acquires or searches for a particular satel-
lite signal by correlating its own replica of that specific
satellite’s pseudorandom code with the received signal.
If the search results in a correlation value above a cer-
tain threshold, the receiver then switches to tracking and
demodulating the navigation message data. It is impor-
tant to note that GPS receivers acquire and track only
the satellite signal that produces the strongest correla-
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Figure 5: Auxiliary Peak Tracking (APT): SPREE uses
more than one channel to acquire, track and decode each
satellite’s signal. This enables tracking of signals that
produce weaker acquisition correlation peaks.
tion peak and ignore any weaker correlation peaks as
noise.
In SPREE, we allocate more than one channel to the
same satellite. This means that in addition to tracking the
signal that results in the strongest correlation, SPREE
can also track weaker correlation peaks (if present) for
the same satellite. In other words, SPREE does not
restrict itself to the satellite signals that produces the
maximum correlation, but it also detects and tracks
signals that produces weaker correlation (Figure 5).
Spoofing detection by tracking auxiliary peaks: The
Auxiliary Peak Tracker protects SPREE from attackers
who are not synchronized to the authentic GPS signals.
Recall that the attacker transmits spoofing signals with
a higher power such that the authentic GPS signals are
overshadowed. Even though the spoofing signals have
successfully overshadowed the authentic signals, they
are still present in the environment and it is difficult
for an attacker to completely annihilate them. In order
to completely annihilate authentic GPS signals, the at-
tacker first needs to know the precise location (cm level)
of the receiver. Furthermore, he needs to annihilate all
the multipath components of the GPS signal at the re-
ceiver. This means that the attacker should be able to
transmit nulling signals such that they cancel both the
direct GPS signal and all the possible multipath compo-
nents at the receiver. In case the receiver is in motion,
the attacker must be able to predict the exact trajectory
of the receiver. Given the difficulty of completely an-
nihilating authentic satellite signals, they will appear as
auxiliary peaks when the attacker’s spoofing signals are
non-coherent or in other words not synchronized with the
authentic satellite signals. We provide a more detailed
analysis on how SPREE’s APT module enables detection
of even the strong seamless takeover attackers in Sec-
tion 6.
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Figure 6: SPREE compares the received TOW to its in-
ternal clock and validates whether TOW is increased in
6 s intervals.
4.2 Navigation Message Inspector (NAVI)
The Navigation Message Inspector module inspects the
decoded navigation data for consistency and sanity and
is key to protecting the GPS receiver from attackers who
modify the contents of the navigation message.
Time of Week (TOW) and Receiver’s Clock: One
of the key parameters that an attacker can modify
in-order to spoof a target receiver’s location or time is
the transmission time of the navigation messages. The
navigation data transmitted by each of the satellites are
divided into 5 subframes. Each subframe begins with a
handover word which contains a truncated version of the
time of week (TOW) at which the satellite transmitted
that particular subframe. Each subframe lasts for about
6 seconds and since the TOW is transmitted once every
subframe, it can only increase in steps of 6 seconds. We
leverage the internal clock of SPREE’s hardware and
the fact that the TOW can only change in steps of 6s to
detect spoofing attacks (Figure 6). SPREE records the
received GPS week and time of week with its internal
clock count and raises an alarm if the difference in the
time elapsed internally doesn’t match the newly received
GPS time of week.
Satellite Orbital Positions: In addition to the trans-
mission time of the navigation message, an attacker can
also modify the satellite’s position in the orbit. The
GPS receiver estimates the satellite’s position from the
ephemeris data. For example, Nighswander et al [26]
demonstrated that it is possible to modify the ephemeris
data such that the receiver estimates the satellite to be
in the middle of the earth. The authors executed such
an attack by setting the square root of the semi-major
axis of the satellites orbit to 0. In our design, an
attacker cannot execute such manipulations as SPREE
continuously monitors and evaluates any changes to the
orbital parameters.
Almanac & Ephemeris Data: SPREE continuously
monitors the decoded navigation data from all the visible
satellites and performs a number of consistency checks.
The almanac and ionospheric model data should be the
same across all the navigation frames received from all
the satellites. In addition, whenever feasible SPREE
leverages the availability of navigation data such as
ephemeris, almanac and the ionospheric models from
third-party sources to compare the data decoded by the
GPS receiver. This data is then compared against the
information received from the satellites and is used to
detect spoofing attacks.
Thus, SPREE’s navigation message inspector inde-
pendently protects the receiver from attackers capable of
modifying the navigation message. By combining the
NAVI and APT modules, SPREE detects or constraints
all types of attacks capable of spoofing the receiver’s lo-
cation and time.
5 Implementation
We implemented SPREE based on GNSS-SDR [15], an
open source software defined GPS receiver. GNSS-SDR
is written in C++ and can be configured to process
signals received directly from a radio hardware platform
such as USRP [1] or from a file source. GNSS-SDR
works with a range of hardware platforms and signal
recorders such as USRP, SiGe GN3S Sampler, NSL
Primo [6], IFEN’s NavPort [7] etc. The architecture of
GNSS-SDR largely resembles the design of a typical
GPS receiver as described in Section 2. It consists of
a signal source and a conditioner module which are
responsible for interfacing with the underlying receiver
hardware or file source. Similar to typical GPS receivers,
GNSS-SDR also consists of several channels; each in-
dividual channel managing all the signal processing
related to a single satellite. In GNSS-SDR, the channel
is a software module that encapsulates the functions of
acquisition, tracking and navigation message decoding
blocks. All the channels then report to a module that
estimates the pseudoranges and a number of other
observables. Finally, if enough information is available,
the receiver calculates a position, velocity and time. A
configuration file allows the user to chose operational
parameters such as the sampling frequency, the algo-
rithms to use for each processing block, signal source
etc. We modified the acquisition and tracking modules of
GNSS-SDR to realize SPREE. First, we implement the
auxiliary peak tracking system within the GPS receivers
acquisition module. Recall that the auxiliary peak
tracker enables the receiver to track multiple signals of
the same satellite instead of limiting it to the strongest
component only. We implement the navigation message
inspector which checks the consistency and sanity of the
extracted navigation data within the tracking module of
the receiver.
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Auxiliary Peak Tracking (APT): In SPREE, when a
particular satellite is assigned to a channel, all local peaks
of the acquisition correlation function, which are above a
certain threshold are collected and stored for processing.
This is in contrast to the modern receivers only choosing
the highest correlation peak. Each local peak is then as-
signed to a different channel in descending order of mag-
nitude for tracking. The maximum number of channels
that can track the same satellite is made configurable at
run time. The number of channels that can be assigned
to track the same satellite will influence the number of
peaks that can be evaluated at the same time.
If SPREE is successful in acquiring more than one
peak, it records the differences in their arrival times i.e.,
the separation between two peaks. If the difference is
more than the maximum acceptable time difference,
τmax, SPREE detects a spoofing attack. The value τmax
is set in the configuration file. This check is done
each time a new navigational message is received.
The arrival time is computed in the tracking module,
where it is estimated based on the sample counter of
GNSS-SDR and fine tuned based on the code phase of
the satellite signal. After an auxiliary peak has been
acquired, tracked and evaluated for signs of spoofing
and none are found it is dropped and the channel
is free to acquire another auxiliary peak to evalu-
ate. If the peak remains it will be evaluated again when
a channel is free and all other peaks have been evaluated.
Navigation Message Inspector (NAVI): In GNSS-
SDR, a telemetry decoder is responsible for decoding
the contents of the received navigational message. First,
SPREE records the time of week decoded from each of
the received navigation message subframes. If the differ-
ence in time of week present in consecutive subframes
does not match with its internal clock count (more
than 6 s difference due to the minimum resolution),
SPREE raises an alarm. Next, the stored navigation data
for each of the visible satellites is compared with the
contents of the preceding navigation message for that
particular satellite. If there is a discrepancy between
these two values, SPREE notes it as a possible spoofing
attack. Also, SPREE compares the navigational data
from all satellites with each other for any discrepancies
in the almanac and ephemeris data. Recall that, the
almanac and ionospheric model data should be the same
across all the navigation frames received from all the
satellites. If configured to do so and if possible, it can
also compare the time, almanac, ephemeris and the
ionospheric model data received from the satellites to
data received from third-party sources using the Secure
User Plane Location (SUPL) protocol. These checks
are done each time a new navigation message is received.
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Figure 7: Evaluation Setup: A configuration file speci-
fied vital system parameters such as input source, source
signal sampling rate and configuration of the spoofing
detection module.
In addition to the above modules, we also implement
several existing countermeasures described in Section 3
to facilitate real-world performance evaluations. How-
ever, we restrict our discussion to our main contributions,
the APT and NAVI module as they enable reliable detec-
tion of all known spoofing attacks in literature. It is im-
portant to note that SPREE adds no additional require-
ments on the underlying hardware and supports all the
platform and file sources supported by GNSS-SDR.
6 Security Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate SPREE and present its
security guarantees. Figure 7 shows our evaluation
setup. A configuration file is used to select SPREE’s
parameters including those needed by the spoofing
detection module. In our evaluations, the GPS signal
traces (spoofing and clean) were recorded and stored in
files and later input to SPREE. We evaluated SPREE
against three different sets of GPS signals: (i) a public
repository of spoofing traces (TEXBAT) [17], (ii) signals
recorded through our own wardriving effort and (iii)
spoofing signals generated using COTS GPS simulators.
6.1 GPS Traces
GPS Simulator: First, we evaluated the performance
of SPREE against our own spoofing signals generated
using commercially available GPS simulators. Specif-
ically, we used Spectracom’s GSG-5 Series advanced
GPS simulator [2] in order to generate our spoofing
signals. One of the key features of the simulator is its
ability to generate multipath signals for any satellite.
It is even possible to configure the multipath’s power
levels and time offset i.e., the extra distance travelled
by the multipath relative to the original line-of-sight
(LOS) signal. The GPS simulator traces were mainly
used to evaluate the ability of SPREE to robustly detect
auxiliary peaks. In addition, we used the GPS simulator
traces to simulate attackers capable of manipulating the
8
12
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Figure 8: Our wardriving setup with a front-end con-
sisting of a (1) a active conical GPS antenna and a (2)
USRP N210. The signals were recorded using a (3) lap-
top. The recording were periodically moved to an (4)
external hard disk.
content of the navigation messages.
Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT): TEX-
BAT [17] is a set of digital recordings containing GPS
spoofing tests conducted by the University of Texas at
Austin. TEXBAT is the only publicly available dataset
and the de-facto standard for testing spoofing resilience
of GPS receivers. TEXBAT includes two clean (spoofing
free) data sets in addition to spoofing scenarios based on
the location and time of the clean GPS traces. The set
of spoofing traces contain a wide variety of scenarios
including take-over attacks where either the time or
position of the target receiver is spoofed. The spoofing
signals are closely code-phase aligned with the authentic
signals. Furthermore, the carrier phase of the seamless
takeover scenarios are aligned with the authentic signals
during the takeover.
Wardriving: In addition to using TEXBAT scenarios,
we collected our own GPS traces through an extensive
wardriving effort. We used the wardriving dataset to
evaluate SPREE’s behaviour in a non-adversarial (only
legitimate GPS signals present) scenario and determine
how reliable is SPREE with respect to false alarms. The
setup used for recording the GPS signals during the
wardriving effort is shown in 8. The front end of the
setup consists of an active conical GPS antenna and a
bias-tee. We used an USRP N210 and GNURadio and
recorded raw GPS signals into an external hard disk. The
signals were sampled at 10MHz and stored in complex
data format. The setup itself was powered through the
car’s power outlet. We recorded the GPS signals at vari-
ous locations: (i) An open field, (ii) parking lot of a small
village, (iii) driving on a highway, (iv) driving inside a
city, (v) inside a city with neighbouring tall buildings and
(vi) inside a forest with dense tree cover.
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Figure 9: Spoofing detection in TEXBAT dataset.
SPREE detected auxiliary peaks in all the spoofing
traces. The maximum location offset the attacker could
cause before being detected was less than a kilometer.
6.2 Security Evaluation
Recall that an attacker can influence the receiver’s esti-
mates by either manipulating the contents of the naviga-
tion messages or temporally shifting the navigation mes-
sage signals while transmitting the spoofing signals.
Detecting Non-coherent Attackers: Recall that a non-
coherent attacker’s spoofing signal is not synchronized
with the authentic satellite signals. Even though the
receiver might be locked on to the attacker’s spoofing
signals, the authentic signals will appear as auxiliary
peaks due to the Auxiliary Peak Tracking module. The
effectiveness of detecting such non-coherent spoofing
attacks depends on the ability of the APT module
to detect and track auxiliary peaks. First, using our
own GPS simulator traces, we tested the ability of the
APT module to detect and track multiple acquisition
correlation peaks. Specifically, we leveraged the ability
of the simulator to generate duplicate copies of a satellite
signal at different time intervals away from the original
signal. We generated signal copies spaced between 50ns
to 1000ns and determined that our receiver was able to
reliably detect and track auxiliary peaks spaced 500ns
or more. In some scenarios, it was able to track peaks
much closer, however not reliably (over multiple runs).
Thus, we configured APT module to track auxiliary
peaks that are separated by more than 500ns. The choice
of 500ns separation between two peaks for spoofing
detection is supported by two additional reasons:
(i) During signal acquisition (searching for satellite
signals), GPS receivers shift their correlator typically
by half a chip1 period i.e., 500ns. This means that
most modern receivers can reliably track peaks that are
separated by 500ns and no additional hardware changes
are required to implement SPREE in modern receivers.
1A chip is one bit of the pseudorandom code
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Figure 10: Detecting seamless take over attack. As the attacker begins to drift the spoofing signal away with the
intention of changing the course of the ship, SPREE will detect the auxiliary peak produced by the legitimate satellite
signal and rise an alarm.
(ii) Several prior works on modelling GNSS multipath
signals [12, 18, 21, 23] show that most GPS multipaths
are delayed by less than 300 − 400ns. This means
that it is highly unlikely to observe an auxiliary peak
caused due to legitimate multipath signals occurring
at more than 500ns away from the line-of-sight signal
peak. Moreover, the attenuation and polarization shift
introduced in the legitimate signals due to reflections
that are a few hundred metres away would make the
signal untrackable. We proceeded to evaluate SPREE
against the TEXBAT set of GPS spoofing signal traces
described previously. SPREE detected auxiliary peaks
in all the traces containing spoofing signals and failed
to detect any auxiliary peaks for the clean non-spoofing
traces. Based on the separation of auxiliary peaks at the
time of detection, we evaluated the maximum possible
location offset an attacker could have caused without
being detected and present it in Figure 9. In the case of
the seamless takeover attacks, the maximum deviation
an attacker could introduce in SPREE was about 400
m. It is important to note that traces 1, 2 and 3 contain
spoofing signals that are not as closely synced as the
seamless takeover traces and hence the larger values
for maximum spoofed distance. For completeness, we
processed our wardriving traces that represent clean,
non-spoofing scenarios for any false alarms. SPREE did
not detect any auxiliary peaks.
Detecting Navigation Message Modifications: We
will now analyze SPREE’s resilience against attackers
who modify the contents of the navigation message.
The key parameters that an attacker can manipulate in
the navigation data are the time of transmission and the
satellite’s orbital information present in the almanac and
ephemeris.
Modifying TOW: As described in Section 4.2, the value
of TOW can be altered only in steps of 6 seconds.
SPREE leverages the internal clock of the hardware
receiver to continuously compare the received TOW
data against its internal clock count. SPREE raises an
alarm if the difference in the time elapsed internally
doesn’t match the newly received GPS time of week
information. We note that even a watch crystal today
has an error rating of approximately 10 ppm which is a
drift of less than a second in one day. Therefore a drift
of 6s can be easily detected even without a thermally
controlled crystal oscillators (TCXO2) that is present
in modern hardware receiver platforms. We evaluated
SPREE against such an attack using two GPS simulators
each spoofing the same satellite however with different
TOW data and SPREE successfully detected the attack.
Both the simulators were synchronized to the same
reference clock signal. We used this setup to evaluate
SPREE’s resilience to attacks described in [26] such
as arbitrary manipulation of week numbers and date
desynchronization attacks.
Modifying Ephemeris Data: The attacker can also
manipulate the ephemeris data to force the receiver
to malfunction. Ephemeris data gets updated once
every two hours and contain precise satellite orbital
information including satellite clock biases. However,
it was shown in [26] that it is trivial to force a receiver
to accept ephemeris changes whenever possible. Since
SPREE’s NAVI module keeps track of the elapsed time
using the receiver’s internal clock, it can be configured
to ignore any ephemeris updates within the 2-hour time
interval. It is also important to note that any changes
to the satellite orbital information or in general the
2Modern TCXOs have error ratings between 1− 100ppb and are
available for under $10
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Figure 11: Maximum location offset. An analysis of 73
satellite constellations (as observed during wardriving)
show that a strong attacker can cause a maximum loca-
tion offset of less than 1 km in majority of the scenarios
before being detected.
ephemeris data can be compared against ephemeris data
available from third-party sources [5]. Additionally,
SPREE is capable of recording the ephemeris data
received from all satellites in the past and notify if there
is any unexpected change in the ephemeris data values.
Detecting Seamless Takeover Attack: As described
previously, a seamless takeover attack is an attack in
which the attacker takes control of the victim receiver
without any disruption to its current state. This type
of attacker is one of the strongest attackers known in
literature and no existing countermeasure is effective
in detecting the seamless takeover attack. We will now
see how SPREE enables detecting a seamless takeover
attack. Consider the same example of a ship on its
way from United States to the UK, currently locked
on to legitimate satellite signals. The attacker begins
a seamless takeover by transmitting spoofing signals
that are synced to the legitimate satellite signals but at a
lower power level. The output of the acquisition module
is shown in Figure 10. Notice that the legitimate satellite
signal (shown in green) is stronger than the spoofing
signal but are synchronised to each other. Now the
attacker, increases the spoofing signals power and takes
over the receiver. Note that, even though the receiver is
locked on to the attacker, there is still no change in route
yet. This is because the attacker is both synchronised
to the legitimate signals and is transmitting the same
navigation message. Now, the attacker begins to drift
the spoofing signal away with the intention of changing
the course of the ship. At this point, a typical GPS
receiver will ignore any weaker correlation peaks that
exist and compute its location based on the attackers
signal. However, SPREE will detect an auxiliary peak
and rise an alarm.
Maximum position offset: Recall that, SPREE detects
any modifications to the contents of the navigation
message and tracks peaks of the same satellite that
are separated by more than 500ns. This value was
setup after extensive experiments using signals from
GPS simulators and our own wardriving efforts as
described previously. This means that the attacker
is limited to temporally shifting his spoofing signals
by at most 500ns which results in a 150m change
in the pseudorange estimated by the receiver for that
specific satellite. It is important to note that the effect
of this change in pseudorange caused by the attacker
on the receiver’s final position estimate depends on
the constellation of the satellites. We collected all the
different constellations observed during our wardriving
and evaluated the effect of temporally shifting the
satellite pseudoranges by 150m. Our analysis accounted
for all possible pseudorange changes an attacker can
introduce on all combinations of visible satellites. We
analyzed over 73 different satellite constellations, each
one with four satellites, and calculated the maximum
possible location offset an attacker could introduce.
Our results are shown in Figure 11. On an average the
maximum position deviation was 455m. This means
that e.g., in the ship hijack scenario, it would not be
possible for an attacker to deviate the course of the ship
by more than 455m. Note that, we limited our analysis
to constellations consisting of only four visible satellites,
which is the most favourable for an attacker. In most
environments, more than four satellites will be visible,
which will further constrain how much the attacker can
change the victim’s position. Furthermore, we observed
that the constellations that allow the attacker to spoof
the receiver more than 1 km away, comprised satellites
at very low elevation angles. Therefore, configuring
SPREE to only accept satellite signals with a minimum
elevation angle will potentially constrain the attacker
further.
7 Discussion
Integrating SPREE into commercial receivers: One
of the main differences between SPREE and a commer-
cial GPS receiver is that unlike commercial receivers
which track one satellite per channel, SPREE uses multi-
ple channels to track the same satellite. This means that
without any hardware changes i.e., for the same number
of acquisition and tracking channels, our spoofing-aware
receiver will track less number of satellites than its ca-
pable of. In order to do this, two changes are necessary:
(i) allocate a minimum of two channels for every visible
satellite signal (one for the authentic GPS signal and
one that keeps searching for a potential spoofing signal)
11
and (ii) search the entire range of time delays for weaker
acquisition peaks. The number of channels allocated
per visible satellite signal can be easily modified in
the firmware. However, as mentioned before, this
will limit the number of satellites that the receiver can
simultaneously acquire and track. Modern receivers
typically have 32− 128 channels capable of tracking
32− 128 satellites simultaneously3 and allocating two
channels for each satellite will reduce the number of
satellites that can be tracked by half. In reality, this is not
a problem since the typical number of visible satellites
at any time instant is not more than 10 or 11. In order
to track auxiliary peaks, we keep a list of all auxiliary
peaks found during the acquisition in a float array. The
number of floats stored is 2 · Fs1000 for each acquisition,
where Fs denotes the sampling rate. This means that
for a sampling rate of 10 MHz each acquisition requires
an additional ≈ 19.5kB of storage. We believe this to
be negligible when compared to the available RAM in
most of the modern receivers today. There is practically
no performance overhead in detecting changes to the
contents of the navigation message by an attacker. The
only waiting time is the time (≈ 6s) needed to receive
and decode the new subframe completely. Hence our
design modifications can be easily integrated into a
modern GPS receiver with only a firmware upgrade and
does not require any changes to the underlying hardware.
Probability of False Alarms: False alarms can be
caused due to an event that forced SPREE to believe
it is being spoofed. In the case of the auxiliary peak
tracking module, the arrival of a legitimate multipath sig-
nal with a delay of more than 500ns and with a signal
strength greater than the acquisition threshold will result
in SPREE raising a spoofing alert. This is unlikely to be
captured by the GPS receiver due to the following rea-
sons: (i) change in polarization–GPS signals are typi-
cally right hand polarized and any reflections causes a
change in the polarization of the signal. Majority of GPS
receiver antennas are configured to received the direct
right hand circularly polarized signals and attenuate re-
flected signals. (ii) Propagation path loss–Since the mul-
tipath signals travel a few hundred metres more than the
direct line of sight signal, the signals undergo more at-
tenuation due to propagation path loss. Also, reflections
from surfaces themselves may cause the GPS signal to
attenuate and therefore, given the received power levels
of direct line of sight GPS signals on the ground, mul-
tiple reflections would eventually only make the signal
untrackable. In addition, auxiliary peaks caused by legit-
imate multipaths tend to be momentary and untrackable
in contrast to a peak caused by a seamless takeover at-
3sometimes used in receiver’s capable of using more than one satel-
lite navigation system such as GLONASS
tack. Recall that, SPREE did not detect any auxiliary
peak beyond the set τmax of 500ns on the traces collected
during our wardriving effort. In fact, an analysis of the
temporal behaviour of multipath signals against spoofing
signals can enable distinct identification of peaks caused
due to a spoofing signal. Note that, even after detect-
ing auxiliary peaks, it is currently difficult to distinctly
identify the peak caused by the spoofing signal and that
caused by the legitimate signal. Thus the results of the
temporal behavioural analysis can help the receiver to ig-
nore or internally cancel the spoofing signal and thereby
building better resilience to spoofing attacks.
8 Related Work
The work that comes closest to SPREE is the design of an
inline anti-spoofing device [20]. The device connects be-
tween the GPS antenna and a GPS receiver and uses com-
plex correlation peak distortion techniques to identify
spoofing signals. As demonstrated in [36], such counter-
measures face the challenge of distinguishing spoofing
signals from real-world channel effects and are ineffec-
tive against seamless takeover attackers. Also, the de-
vice is incapable of detecting attackers who modify the
contents of the navigation messages. Several works [19,
22, 35] propose solutions that are cryptographic in na-
ture and therefore require modifications to the GPS in-
frastructure. Incorporating cryptographic authentication
into civilian GPS, similar to military GPS, could to an
extent mitigate spoofing attacks. However this would
require distribution and management of shared secrets
which makes it infeasible for a large set of applications.
Additionally, cryptographic authentication does not pro-
tect against signal replay attacks where an attacker sim-
ply records legitimate GPS signals at one location and re-
plays it to the victim receiver [27]. Some other proposals
depended on additional hardware such as additional re-
ceivers, alternative navigation systems, sensors etc. Tip-
penhauer et al. [31] proposed the use of multiple syn-
chronized GPS receivers to detect spoofing. They show
that spoofing a set of synchronized GPS receivers, with
known relative distances or geometrical constellation re-
stricts the number of locations from where an attacker
can transmit the spoofing signals. Cross-validation of
the position estimates against alternate navigation sys-
tems such as Galileo [16] were also proposed. However,
a simulator that can spoof both GPS and Galileo will eas-
ily defeat this countermeasure. Data from other sensors
can also be used to cross validate GPS navigation so-
lutions. For example, inertial measurement units (e.g.,
accelerometer, gyroscope, compass) have already been
proposed as alternative ways to navigate during tempo-
rary GPS outages [14, 32, 34]. The main drawback of
inertial navigation units is the accumulating error of the
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sensor measurements. These accumulated sensor mea-
surement errors affect the estimated position and veloc-
ity over longer duration of time and hence limit the max-
imum time an IMU can act independently.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented SPREE, the first GPS receiver
that detects all known spoofing attacks. We designed, im-
plemented and evaluated SPREE against different sets of
signal traces and showed that even a strong attacker ca-
pable of a seamless takeover cannot deviate the receiver
by more than 1 km. This is a vast improvement over cur-
rent GPS receivers that can be spoofed to any arbitrary
location in the world. Finally, we release our implemen-
tation and the GPS dataset used in our evaluations to the
research community.
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Appendix
Trace Set Description
Trace 1 (ds3) Static Matched Time Push
Trace 2 (ds2) Static Overpowered Time Push
Trace 3 (ds4) Static Matched Position Push
Seamless 1 (ds7) Seamless Carrier Phase Aligned
Seamless 2 (ds8) Security Code Estimation Replay
Table 1: TEXBAT Spoofing Traces as mapped in Fig-
ure 9
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